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Chapter 1
An Introduction to Nonlinear
Pricing and Welfare
1.1 Introduction and Outline of the Chapter
Problems associated with monopoly power have received considerable attention in
economic literature. It is well known that a firm exercising monopoly power over a
given market can raise its price above the competitive price (i.e. the marginal cost). This
leads to a dead-weight welfare loss for society. In order to reduce the welfare loss that
is caused by the pricing behavior of the monopoly, several alternative suggestions have
been presented in the literature. One recommendation is to regulate the monopoly in
the sense that a social planner (regulator) specifies the price that the firm is allowed to
charge the consumers. A second proposal is to let the government finance the deficit
that is associated with marginal cost pricing through taxation. These dividing lines are
discussed in Section 1.2, where we start by investigating under what circumstances a
(natural) monopoly arises.
One of the main conclusions in Section 1.2 is that the welfare loss can be reduced by
allowing the monopoly to charge the consumers a nonlinear tariff. However, there are
other arguments in favor of nonlinear pricing. The two main motivations are: nonlinear
tariffs typically Pareto dominate linear pricing rules and nonlinear pricing can be used
as an instrument to redistribute income among consumers. Hence, nonlinear pricing can
be motivated both by efficiency arguments and by redistributive objectives. Nonlinear
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pricing and related topics are discussed in Section 1.3. In order to investigate and analyze
nonlinear pricing schedules, a theoretical model is required. In Section 1.4, we introduce
the ”standard” framework for analyzing nonlinear pricing schedules in a finite economy
with a (single product) natural monopoly. We state, discuss and motivate the ”standard”
assumptions in the literature. This framework forms the base on which this thesis is built.
In Section 1.5, we specify the purpose of this thesis and summarize the main findings.
Note, finally, that this introductory chapter should by no means be regarded as a
complete introduction to the natural monopoly and the nonlinear pricing literature. Many
interesting contributions have not been included and some important topics will only be
discussed briefly in footnotes. In the latter case, we refer to at least one seminal article
or a general survey of the topic without going into details. The material in this chapter
borrows from the work of Baumol et al. (1982), Braeutigam (1989), Tirole (1988), Varian
(1989) and Wilson (1993).
1.2 The Natural Monopoly
In this section, we describe circumstances under which a natural monopoly arises. We also
state some of the problems that are associated with monopoly power and briefly discuss
a few proposals that have been suggested in order to, at least partially, overcome these
problems.
1.2.1 The Definition of a Natural Monopoly
In the traditional view, a natural monopoly arises when there are increasing returns to
scale or, more generally, non-convexities in the production set of the firm.1 If the firm
produces a single product2 and faces constant factor prices, the notation of economies
of scale means that the average cost schedule for the firm declines as market output
increases. In this case, the market is said to be characterized by a natural monopoly since
competition within the market is not possible. The traditional definition of a natural
monopoly has been challenged by a definition that rests on the concept of subadditivity
1For a thorough description of these concepts see e.g. Kahn (1971) or Quinzii (1992) among others.
2In this chapter, as well as in the rest of the thesis, we shall only consider a single product natural
monopoly. For the multiproduct case, see e.g. Baumol (1977) or Baumol et al. (1982).
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of the cost function, see e.g. Baumol et al. (1977,1982) or Sharkey (1982). Subadditivity
of the cost function refers to a situation where one firm can produce the outputs at least
as cheaply as two separate firms. The definition of a natural monopoly then becomes
(Baumol et al., 1982, p.17):
”An industry is said to be a natural monopoly if, over the entire relevant
range of outputs, the firms’ cost function is subadditive”.
These two definitions are, of course, related to each other but they are not identical.
If, for example, a firm produces a single good, faces constant factor prices and there
are (global) economies of scale, the average cost is (globally) declining and, as a conse-
quence, the cost function is subadditive. Hence, (global) increasing returns to scale imply
subadditivity in the single product case.3 The converse is, however, false. To see this,
consider the following example that we have illustrated in Figure 1.1.4 Assume that a
single firm produces a single good and that all firms that might like to supply the good on
the market have identical cost functions. Suppose also that all consumers face the same
marginal price, p, and that the firm receives no subsidy from the government, i.e. total
cost must be covered solely by the price that the consumers are charged. The aggregated
demand curve D(q) intersects the average cost curve AC(q) when consumption is q0. The
output level that is associated with minimum average cost q1 is, however, smaller than
q0. Hence, there are only economies of scale in the range of output 0 < q < q1. The cost
function is, however, subadditive in the interval 0 < q < q0 since it not is possible for two
separate firms to produce output q0 at a lower price (recall that all firms have identical
cost functions). Thus, subadditivity does not imply global economies of scale.
By applying the above arguments, we conclude that in the case of a single prod-
uct monopoly that faces constant factor prices, the subadditivity definition of a natural
monopoly is more appropriate than the traditional definition since a monopoly does not
need to exhibit economies of scale in the whole range of output and, moreover, global
increasing returns imply subadditivity.
3In the multiproduct case this need not to be true, see Baumol et al. (1982,pp.173) for an example.
4The example is from Braeutigam (1989,pp.1295).
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Figure 1.1. Monopoly Power without (Global) Economies of Scale
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1.2.2 The Control of the Natural Monopoly
As established earlier in this chapter, there is a dead-weight welfare loss associated with
the monopolist’s pricing behavior since a firm with monopoly power can raise its price
above the competitive price. However, forcing the monopolist firm to sell its product at
the marginal cost is not feasible due to negative profits. So, on the one hand, we have
the problem of distortions due to the pricing behavior of the monopoly and, on the other
hand, we have the feasibility (break-even) problem. Several different ways have been
suggested in the literature in order to, at least partially, overcome both these problems.
One stream of economists has advocated a marginal cost pricing rule, where the deficit
is financed through taxation. An alternative suggestion is to regulate the monopoly in
the sense that a social planner specifies the price that the firm is allowed to charge the
consumers. In both cases, total revenue for the monopoly firm will be larger than or
equal to total costs, i.e. the monopoly will make a non-negative profit. In this section, we
discuss these two dividing lines in the literature and a few other interesting contributions
that are related to auction theory.
For example Lerner (1937) and Hotelling (1938,1939) advocated marginal cost pricing
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in combination with taxation (the ”MC rule”, henceforth) for industries with increasing
returns. The advantage of the MC rule is that the firm breaks-even and the socially
optimal quantity is supplied on the market. This suggestion is, however, controversial
and has been criticized on several grounds. One of the main criticisms, pointed out by
Meade (1944), is that in the absence of a lump-sum tax, the social planner must impose a
distortionary tax on the tax payers. Coase (1945,1946) has criticized the MC pricing rule
from a different perspective. He argues that if the consumers are charged the marginal
cost and if the deficit is financed by the government, then the government decides for the
consumers that they are willing to finance the deficit. It is likely that the government
lacks information of the social valuation of the good (i.e. the consumers’ willingness-to-
pay) and it is therefore possible that the MC rule is implemented, even though it may
not be worth incurring the fixed cost for society.
As argued above, the obvious alternative to the MC rule is to allow the monopoly to
operate on or above the average cost curve. In this case, negative profits are eliminated.
However, in order to reduce the distortions that are caused by the pricing behavior of the
monopoly, the monopoly must be regulated. If a system of regulation has been devised by
the government (the social planner) for the natural monopoly, we refer to this system as a
regulatory contract. This contract specifies the price that the firm is allowed to charge the
consumers. The ”optimal” design of the regulatory contract depends on several factors,
among them the information that is available for the social planner, legal constraints and
dynamics. Different types of regulatory contracts in various economic environments are
investigated and analyzed in the magisterial book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation written by J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1993).
If the monopoly is subject to regulation, the pricing rule is specified in the regulatory
contract as stated above. One example of a pricing rule is the Ramsey-Boiteux5 rule, where
the prices are given by the Ramsey-Boiteux formula, i.e. the price-marginal cost ratio of
the good is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand for the good. Depending
on the elasticity of demand for the good, on the given market, prices will deviate from
the socially preferred price. This enables the firm to break-even and the distortions
are reduced at the same time. For a rigorous analysis, see for instance Vogelsang and
5The Boiteux (1956) contribution is closely related to Ramsey’s (1927) optimal tax problem, which
explains the name.
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Finsinger (1979), Brown and Sibley (1985) or Wilson (1993,ch.5). A second example
is the so called two-part tariff, where the consumers pay a fixed charge and a constant
marginal price. The pricing rules in both these examples have one thing in common: they
are both nonlinear. Nonlinear tariffs are appealing for several reasons. One reason is
the possibility for the monopoly to break-even. A second reason is that nonlinear tariffs
typically Pareto dominate linear pricing rules (e.g. the average cost pricing rule). Section
1.3, as well as the whole of this thesis, is devoted to nonlinear pricing and we, therefore,
content ourselves, for the moment, with the fact that nonlinear price schedules have some
desirable characteristics, among them the possibility for the monopoly to break-even.
So far we have focused on a situation where there is no competition within the market
due to the monopoly power. An alternative approach to the regulatory process is to
investigate the possibilities for firms to compete for the market. Demsetz (1968) suggests
in his, by now, classical article that even if competition within the market is not possible,
competition can be introduced for the right to operate on the market by means of an
auction. This requires that inputs are available at competitive prices and that the cost
of collusion6 among bidding firms is ”sufficiently high”. In a proposal that is related to
the Demsetz suggestion, which applies in the case when the monopoly is publicly owned,
Williamson (1976) suggests that the social planner can auction off the right to operate
the publicly owned monopoly to one of several bidding firms. In the case where there
are no sunk costs, Baumol et al. (1982) demonstrate that competition for the market
can be introduced without the supervision of a social planner. In all the above cases,
the competition forces the firms to reduce prices and, as a consequence, the dead-weight
loss that is associated with monopoly power decreases. Note also that the firm will not
compete for the market unless the profit is non-negative, which solves the feasibility
problem.
For a thorough description of the various suggestions in this section, see for example
Braeutigam (1989) or Viscusi et al. (2000).
6For more on collusion, see e.g. Laffont (2000).
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1.3 Nonlinear Pricing
As concluded in the previous section, nonlinear pricing can be motivated from a feasibility
(i.e. break-even) perspective. There are, however, other arguments in favor of nonlinear
pricing. In this section, we state a few of these. We also define the concept of nonlinear
pricing and relate it to the concept of (second-degree) price discrimination.
1.3.1 What is Nonlinear Pricing?
The price of a good is said to be nonlinear if the unit price is not constant but depends
on how much the consumer buys7, i.e. the producer sells different units of output at
different prices, but every consumer who buys the same amount of the good pays the
same price. This form of pricing is commonly used in many regulated8 industries such
as the electricity, water and gas industries. To illustrate the principle, consider Table 1.1
where the price of water in the city of Lund, Sweden, is displayed for a sample of different
quantities.9
Table 1.1. Price of Water in Lund, Sweden
Quantity (cubic metres) Outlay (SEK) Price per cubic metre
1000 14000 14
2000 27375 13.68
3000 40750 13.58
4000 54125 13.53
By investigating the table, it is clear that the price per cubic metre depends on how
much water that is purchased. Hence, the price of water is nonlinear in the above example.
A nonlinear tariff or, equivalently, a nonlinear outlay schedule specifies the total charge
7In this section, we focus on nonlinear prices that are dependent on the quantity purchased. For the
case of quality-dependent nonlinear prices, the classical reference is Mussa and Rosen (1978).
8Note here that nonlinear tariffs are common in many unregulated industries. Examples of this include
the price of advertising in magazines that depends on the size of the advertisement, and railroad tariffs
that specify charges based on e.g. weight, volume and distance.
9Source: Lunds Kommun, Tekniska Fo¨rvaltningen VA-verket (www.lund.se). Prices include taxes and
are valid for the year 2003 for water meters with a diameter of 20 millimetres.
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payable by the consumers for their chosen consumptions of the good. The perhaps simplest
example of a nonlinear tariff is the so-called two-part tariff, in which the consumer pays an
initial fixed fee for the first unit plus a smaller constant price for each unit after the first.
This is the case in the above example, where the consumers pay an access charge of 625
SEK and a constant unit price of 13.375 SEK per cubic metre of water, i.e. the tariff, t, is
given by: t = 625+13.375·q, where q represents the chosen consumption. Another example
of a nonlinear tariff is the so-called blocking-tariff. In this case, the marginal prices of
successive units decline in steps. If, for example, a motorist in Sweden (Denmark) takes
the O¨resund Bridge to Denmark (Sweden), the marginal price is dependent on how many
times the motorist crosses the bridge. This is illustrated in Table 1.2.10
Table 1.2. The O¨resund Bridge Prices for Private Vehicles up to 6 Metres
Quantity (number of crossings) Outlay (SEK) Price per crossing
1 275 275
2 275 · 2 = 550 275
n > 2 750 + 137 · (n− 2) 476
n
+ 137
Two-part tariffs and blocking-tariffs are just two examples of nonlinear tariffs. Obvi-
ously, there are several other nonlinear tariffs e.g. fixed-fee tariffs, three-part tariffs and
Ramsey prices. The interested reader is referred to Wilson (1993) for a thorough overview.
The various types of nonlinear tariffs do, however, have one thing in common: they can all
be completely described by a menu of consumption-outlay pairs. A consumption-outlay
pair or, equivalently, a bundle consists of a chosen consumption (e.g. 1000 cubic metres of
water) and an outlay that is associated with the chosen consumption (e.g. 14000 SEK).
The menu is a list of consumption-outlay pairs, which is offered to the consumers and
every consumer who chooses to buy the good picks a preferred consumption and pays the
associated charge. Since consumers typically have different valuations of the good, the
menu consists of a number of differing bundles. Note, finally, that in the case when the
firm is regulated, the social planner designs the menu that the firm is allowed to offer the
consumers, see e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993,pp.175).
10Source: O¨resundskonsortiet (www.oresundsbron.com). Prices are valid for the year 2003 (including
taxes) when the motorist has a BroBizz, i.e. a small transmitter that automatically registers the journey
at the payment station. The cost of the BroBizz is 200 SEK.
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1.3.2 Price Discrimination versus Nonlinear Pricing
It is hard to come up with a satisfactory definition of price discrimination. Roughly, price
discrimination is said to exist when the same physical good is sold to different consumers
at different prices. This definition is, however, unsatisfactory for several reasons. For
example, if a monopoly serves a geographic area (such as Sweden) and if the monopoly pro-
vides the transportation of the good, a uniform delivered price is discriminatory, whereas
delivered prices that respond to transportation-cost differentials are not. Since there is
no consensus in the literature on what price discrimination actually is, economists have
come up with two competing definitions. The first is the price-cost-ratio (see e.g. Stigler,
1987) and the second is the so-called price-cost-margin (see e.g. Phlips, 1983). Clerides
(2001) compares these two definitions and concludes that ”the margin definition is the
more appropriate one to use in most situations and corresponds more closely to our usual
notation of price discrimination” (ibid.,p.1).
Following Pigou (1920), it is customary to distinguish between three types of price dis-
crimination. First-degree (or perfect) price discrimination refers to a situation where the
firm has perfect information about each consumer’s demand for the good and therefore
each consumer is being charged his exact willingness-to-pay. Third-degree price discrim-
ination refers to a situation where consumer characteristics such as age or geographical
location are correlated with willingness-to-pay. In this case, discrimination is based on
these characteristics. Examples of this include senior citizen discounts and differentiated
prices of pharmaceuticals in geographically separated markets. What is of larger interest
for this thesis is the so-called second-degree price discrimination11, in which discrimina-
tion occurs on the basis of unobservable consumer characteristics, e.g. willingness-to-pay.
The fact that consumer characteristics are unobservable does not mean that the good is
sold at a single price on the market. Instead the firm offers the consumers a menu of
consumption-outlay bundles to choose from. This schedule involves different unit prices
for different amounts of the good purchased. Hence, nonlinear pricing is equivalent to
second-degree price discrimination.
However, in order for second-degree price discrimination (in fact, any type of price
discrimination) to be a viable pricing strategy for the firm, the following three conditions
11Second-degree price discrimination is also known as versioning, see Shapiro and Varian (1998) and
Varian (2000).
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must be satisfied:12
- The firm must have monopoly power. If the market is competitive, the firm will
have difficulties charging different prices for different consumers.
- The firm must possess information about different types of consumers and their
demand curves. If this information is unknown, it is not possible to design consumer
(alternatively, market or household) specific prices.
- The firm must be able to prevent resale of the good. If resale is possible, some
consumers can profit from arbitrage.
If the above three conditions are satisfied, it is possible to design a menu of differing
consumption-outlay bundles, i.e. nonlinear pricing is feasible. Note, finally, that there
may be legal constraints that forbid the monopoly to discriminate between consumers.
For a discussion of the legal aspects of price discrimination, see e.g. Neale and Goyder
(1980), Varian (1989,pp.643) or Viscusi et al. (2000).
1.3.3 Motivations for Nonlinear Pricing
In Section 1.2, we concluded that a monopoly can cover its cost by offering the consumers
a nonlinear tariff. There are, however, other motivations in favor of nonlinear tariffs. The
main objective of this section is to investigate two of these motivations. In particular,
we argue that nonlinear tariffs typically Pareto dominate linear pricing rules and that
nonlinear pricing can be used as an instrument to redistribute income among consumers.
In a well known article, Willing (1978) demonstrated that any uniform price not equal
to marginal cost can be Pareto dominated by a nonlinear tariff (see also Seade, 1977). To
see this, consider the following simple example.13 Suppose that there are two consumers
in the economy, one with a low demand for the good, DL, and one with a high demand
for the good, DH . The cost function is assumed to be affine, i.e. the production involves a
fixed cost, F , and a constant marginal cost, β. Moreover, the monopoly is publicly owned
12See e.g. Varian (1989,p.599) or Wilson (1993,pp.10)
13A similar example can be found in Braeutigam (1989,pp.1329).
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Figure 1.2. A Pareto Improving Tariff
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and restricted by a balanced-budget requirement14. Consider next Figure 1.2, where the
lowest uniform price that allows the firm to break-even is given by p0. At this price,
the profit is zero, implying that p0 is equal to the average cost and strictly larger than
the marginal cost. Moreover, q0L and q
0
H are consumption for the two consumers, so the
deadweight welfare loss for society is given by the area A+B. Consider next a nonlinear
tariff of the type:
t =
{
p0qi if qi ≤ q0H
p0q0H + β(qi − q0H) if qi > q0H .
With this new schedule, consumer H increases consumption to the first-best level q∗H .
Consumer L still consumes q0L units of the good since q
∗
L < q
0
H by assumption (see Figure
1.2). Hence, the deadweight loss B is eliminated. Moreover, the above nonlinear schedule
is Pareto improving since consumer H is strictly better off, consumer L is not worse-
off and the firm still breaks-even. The main conclusion from the above example is that
nonlinear pricing can be motivated from an efficiency perspective.
A second argument in favor of nonlinear pricing is that nonlinear schedules can be
used as a tool to redistribute income among consumers. This point is also illustrated with
the aid of a simple example. The example is based on the above premises and we shall
also assume that the income elasticity is zero, i.e. that the preferences of the consumers
can be represented by a quasi-linear utility function. Suppose first that the consumers are
14This is known as cost-of-service pricing. For theoretical contributions, see e.g. Averch and Johnson
(1962), Breyer (1982), Khan (1971) and Schmalensee (1979) among others.
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Figure 1.3. Redistribution of Income through Nonlinear Pricing
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offered a uniform two-part tariff15 of the type t = A+pqi, where A is a fixed access charge
and p is the marginal price. Since the firm is restricted by a balanced-budget requirement,
we set p = β and A = F
2
. Facing the two-part tariff t = F
2
+ βqi, both consumers choose
to consume the first-best quantity, q∗i .
16 In Figure 1.3, consumer i’s indifference curves,
ui, are represented in the quantity-outlay space. The utility for consumer i ∈ {L,H} is
increasing in the south-east direction. Note also that the indifference curves are parallel-
shifted since the income elasticity is zero. Say now that the firm offers the consumers a
nonlinear tariff of the type:
td =
{
AL + βqi if qi ≤ q∗L
AH + βqi if qi > q
∗
L,
where AL < AH and
AL+AH
2
= F
2
= A. From the figure, it is clear that both consumers
consume their first-best quantity. But in this case, consumer L ends up with a higher
utility and consumer H with a lower utility. Hence, the price schedule redistributes
15This is also known as Coase two-part pricing.
16This rests on the assumption that the surplus for consumer L is so high that he can afford to pay
half of the fixed cost.
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income from consumer H to consumer L. Note also that it is easy to construct tariffs
that redistribute income from type L to type H.17
The above examples illustrate two appealing characteristics of nonlinear pricing. Namely,
nonlinear pricing can be used as a tool to achieve efficiency, and nonlinear pricing can be
used as an instrument to redistribute income.
1.4 The Standard Framework
The objective of this section is to introduce a framework for analyzing nonlinear outlay
schedules. This framework is based on the theory of optimal nonlinear taxation, which was
formulated first by Mirrlees (1971).18 Nonlinear pricing has, however, been investigated
and analyzed in a large number of different economic environments, so in order to make
our presentation of the ”standard framework” manageable, we shall limit our description
to a finite static economy with a single product natural monopoly.19 This is also the type
of economy that is under consideration in Chapters 2-4 of this thesis. The reader who is
interested in nonlinear pricing in an economy with a continuum of consumers is referred
to Goldman et al. (1984), Littlechild (1975), Roberts (1979), Spence (1977) or Srinagesh
(1986). Much of the work on dynamic nonlinear pricing is based on the seminal article by
Coase (1972). Multiproduct nonlinear pricing is investigated by e.g. Armstrong (1996)
and Spence (1980).
1.4.1 The Consumers
Consumers have preferences over consumption-outlay bundles xi = (qi, ti), where qi rep-
resents consumption and ti represents the outlay that is associated with consumption qi.
The economy is finite and the consumers are gathered in the set {1, ..., n} = N . This
type of finite economy is considered in e.g. Guesnerie and Seade (1982) and Sharkey and
Sibley (1993). Consumer preferences are represented by a utility function: ui(qi, ti) for
17Again, this requires that net utility for type L is non-negative.
18See also Mirrlees (1976). Alternative formulations are developed by e.g. Brito et al. (1990), Guesnerie
and Seade (1982) and Roberts (1979).
19Note that this does not mean that we will only refer to work that is based on a finite economy in the
subsequent sections.
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i ∈ N . If we set ti equal to zero, it is natural to interpret ui(qi, 0) as the consumer’s
maximum willingness-to-pay for a purchase of size qi. A standard assumption is that
willingness-to-pay for the good is measured by the Marshallian consumer surplus. It is
well known that the use of the (Marshallian) demand to measure the welfare change that
is associated with a price change will be an exact measure if there are zero income effects.
Willing (1976) demonstrated that even if there are non-zero income effects, the (Marshal-
lian) consumer surplus may serve as a good measure to approximate the actual welfare
change. This result is often used to motivate the assumption that preferences can be rep-
resented by a quasi-linear utility function, i.e. a utility function with zero income effects.
Utility functions with non-zero income effects has been investigated by e.g. Guesnerie
and Laffont (1984), Mirrlees (1976), Spence (1977) and Wilson (1993,ch.7).
Differences in willingness-to-pay between consumers are often supposed to captured
with a single parameter, θi ∈ R++.20 This assumption, in combination with quasi-linearity,
enables us to write the net utility for consumer i ∈ N as: u(qi, ti, θi) = φ(qi, θi)− ti, where
φ(qi, θi) represents the consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay for a purchase of size qi.
One motivation for this representation of net utility is identical preferences for the good
and net income, combined with variations in gross income. In this case, differences in θi
are entirely due to differences in (gross) incomes. By normalization, a higher value of θi is
associated with a higher willingness-to-pay. Since willingness-to-pay is increasing in θi, it
is natural to assume that the marginal utility of the good, for any given quantity, is also
increasing in θi. If this is the case, the so-called single-crossing condition
21 is satisfied.
The interpretation of this condition is that for the given quantity where the indifference
curves of two types cross (e.g. q∗L in Figure 1.3), the indifference curve of the type with the
highest willingness-to-pay is steeper. A second interpretation is that the demand curves
of different consumers never cross. This condition enables us to sort the consumers in a
natural way (recall from Section 1.3.2 that a necessary condition for nonlinear pricing is
that it is possible to sort the consumers). It should be noted here that not all work in the
literature is based on preferences that satisfy the single-crossing property, see e.g. Araujo
20This is for example the case in Cooper (1984), Goldman et al. (1984), Leyland and Meyer (1976),
Maskin and Reily (1984), Spence (1977), Srinagesh (1986) and Thomas (2002).
21This property is also known as the Spence-Mirrlees condition and is attributed to Mirrlees (1971)
and Spence (1973).
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and Moreira (2000) or Brito el at. (1990).22
We conclude that in a large proportion of the studies in the nonlinear pricing literature,
consumers are supposed to be completely described by a single parameter and, moreover,
the preferences of the consumers are assumed to be represented by a quasi-linear utility
function, which satisfies the single-crossing property.
1.4.2 The Determination of the Optimal Outlay Schedule
Suppose that all nonlinear outlay schedules of type x = {xi}i∈N are collected in the set X.
Since this set typically consists of a large number of schedules, the problem is to identify
the ”optimal” schedule. In the ”standard” framework, the optimal schedule is defined as
the schedule that maximizes a weighted combination of consumers’ net utility, u(xi, θi),
and producer profit, pi(x). Hence, the optimal schedule is found by maximizing:
max
x∈X
{∑
i∈N
αiu(xi, θi) + γpi(x)
}
. (1.1)
In the above specification, the parameter αi and γ represents the welfare weights. The
way in which ”optimal” nonlinear price schedules vary, depending on these weights, has
been investigated in the literature by e.g. Sharkey and Sibley (1993). Note also that
by defining γ ≡ 1 + λ, the parameter λ > 0 can be interpreted as the shadow cost of
public funds23, see e.g. Vogelsang (1990) or Laffont and Tirole (1993). There are three
benchmark cases in the literature:
(i) The monopoly is privately owned and unregulated. In this case, all αi are set to zero.
This type of environment has been investigated by e.g. Cooper (1984), Maskin and
Reily (1984) and Oi (1971).
(ii) The monopoly is privately owned and regulated.24 In this case αi ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0. For
22In the case where there are (i) more than two commodities or (ii) there is multidimensional asym-
metries of information between buyer and seller, it may be difficult to define natural single-crossing
conditions, see e.g. Laffont et al. (1987), McAfee and McMillian (1988) or Armstrong (1996).
23That is, if the government raises 1 SEK, society pays (1 +λ) > 1 SEK due to inefficiencies in the tax
system.
24The regulatory literature has grown rapidly since the pioneering work by Baron and Meyerson (1982)
and Sappington (1982,1983). For a survey, see e.g. Caillaud et al. (1988) or Laffont (1994).
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example, Laffont and Tirole (1993,ch.3) and Wilson (1993,ch.15) provide a model
for analyzing nonlinear pricing schedules in this type of environment.
(iii) The monopoly is publicly owned and operates under a balanced-budget requirement.
In this case, γ is set to zero. Nonlinear outlay schedules have been analyzed in this
type of environment by e.g. Laffont (1997) and Sharkey and Sibley (1993).
Note here that in Cases (ii) and (iii), a social planner determines the nonlinear schedule
that the firm is allowed to offer the consumers. If the monopoly has compete information,
it is a straightforward exercise to find the solution to the above maximization problem.
It is, however, not unreasonable to assume that there are asymmetries of information
in the economy. For example, a motorist (i.e. a consumer) in Sweden knows, at least
approximately, how many times he is going to cross the O¨resund Bridge between Sweden
and Denmark during the next month. The ticket-collector (i.e. the monopolist), on
the other hand, can not, by inspecting the motorist, find out the motorist’s demand for
crossings over the bridge during the next month. Hence, the consumer knows something
that the monopolist does not, so we have an asymmetry of information in the economy. It
is, however, not unlikely that the ticket-collector has some information about the number
of motorists that cross the bridge y times every month, where y is some non-negative
integer, i.e. the ticket-collector has some information about the disaggregated demand
for the number of crossings. Formally, this means that, if the consumers are characterized
by a single parameter (as described above), consumer i ∈ N knows his characteristic θi
but the monopolist only knows the vector of characteristics θ = (θ1, ..., θn).
Asymmetries of information can occur in a variety of different forms in the economy.
In a nonlinear pricing environment, the above demand asymmetry is, however, always
present. To see this, note first that, if there is an exogenous signal that reveals each con-
sumer’s demand function, the monopolist will practice first-degree price discrimination
(see Section 1.3.2). Moreover, if the monopolist does not know θ then it is not possi-
ble for the firm to sort the consumers and, therefore, it is not possible for the firm to
design a nonlinear outlay schedule (again, see Section 1.3.2). Additional asymmetries of
information may, however, be present in the economy. In Case (ii) above, it may well be
the case that only the monopolist knows the true demand profile θ and that the social
planner only knows that θ belongs to some set of demand profiles Θ, see e.g. Lewis and
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Sappington (1988). It can also be the case that only the monopolist knows the true cost
function and the social planner only knows that the cost function belongs to some class of
cost functions, see e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993,ch.3). In the most complicated scenario,
the social planner neither knows the true demand profile nor the true cost function, see
e.g. Laffont et al. (1987) or McAfee and McMillian (1988).
The presence of asymmetric information in the economy leads to that the above max-
imization problem (1.1) must be restricted by a set of incentive compatibility constraints.
These constraints guarantee that the best choice for the agent that possesses the pri-
vate information is to reveal the information to the uninformed principal. That is, if a
consumer is free to choose among the (incentive compatible) quantity-outlay pairs in the
menu, then his best choice is to pick the bundle that is directed to him. The require-
ment of incentive compatibility often results in marginal prices that are different from
the marginal cost. This result can, for example, be found in all papers cited in Cases
(i)-(iii) above. Note also that the number of relevant incentive compatibility constraints
are drastically reduced if the single-crossing condition (see Section 1.4.1) is satisfied. In
this case, consumer i ∈ N prefers the bundle that is designed for him over every bundle
in the menu if he prefers the bundle that is intended for him over the bundles that are
designed for his adjacent neighbors (i.e. type i−1 and type i+1). This result is attributed
to Cooper (1984).
In the search for the ”optimal” nonlinear schedule, a set of additional restrictions must
be imposed on top of the incentive compatibility constraints. One such restriction is the
non-negative profit constraint. The reason for this is that if the monopoly is privately
owned, as in Cases (i) and (ii) above, the firm will not supply the good on the market
unless profits are non-negative. This constraint can also be motivated in Case (iii) when
it not is possible or desirable to cover deficits through taxation.
In the process of finding the ”optimal” nonlinear schedule, the reservation utility of the
consumers must also be taken into account. The reason for this is that when a consumer
faces the menu, he will only choose to purchase the good if there exists a quantity-outlay
pair in the menu that gives him a non-negative net utility. Otherwise, he is better off
by not consuming the good. As a consequence, individual rationality constraints must
restrict the above maximization problem. These constraints guarantee that consumers
receive a non-negative net utility from consumption. If the single crossing condition is
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satisfied, it suffices that net utility for the consumer with the lowest valuation of the
good is non-negative, since this implies that the other consumers in the economy obtain a
positive net utility, see e.g. Cooper (1984). Laffont (1997) assumes that the utility from
consumption is so high that the individual rationality constraints can be ignored.
We conclude that in the ”standard framework”, the ”optimal” nonlinear outlay sched-
ule is identified by maximizing a social welfare function that is represented by a weighted
summation of consumers surplus and producer profit. This maximization problem is re-
stricted by a set of incentive compatibility constraints, a non-negative profit constraint
and a set of individual rationality constraints.
1.5 Summary of the Thesis
In this section we summarize the main findings of this thesis and state the main purpose
of the work.
1.5.1 Aim and Scope
This thesis consists of three theoretical essays. The economy under consideration is finite
and the natural monopoly is assumed to be publicly owned and restricted by a balanced-
budget requirement. Given these premises, we characterize and analyze optimal nonlinear
outlay schedules. As established earlier in this chapter, several factors are important in
the process of finding the optimal outlay schedule. In this thesis, we investigate explicitly
two of these factors. Namely:
(i) The set of restrictions that the bundles in the menu are constrained by, e.g. the
incentive compatibility constraints and the non-negative profit constraint.
(ii) The distributional preferences of the social planner. These preferences can, for
example, be captured by the selection of the welfare weights.
The first aim of this thesis is to characterize the set of optimal nonlinear outlay
schedules for various sets of restrictions (Chapter 2 and the first half of Chapter 3). The
second aim of this thesis is to investigate how the characteristics of the optimal nonlinear
outlay schedule are affected by various distributional values (the second half of Chapter
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3 and Chapter 4). In both these respects, this thesis contributes to the existing nonlinear
pricing literature.
1.5.2 The Model and Basic Assumptions in the Thesis
In this section, we specify the model that will be used throughout this thesis. We assume
the following about consumers. (i) There is a finite set of consumers. (ii) Consumers
have preferences over one perfectly divisible good and money. The preferences can be
represented by a quasi-linear utility function. (iii) The marginal utility from consuming
a given quantity of the good is increasing in type.
We assume the following about the natural monopoly. (i) The natural monopoly is
publicly owned. (ii) The monopoly produces a single good with an affine technology.
(iii) The social planner knows the distribution of consumer types but he is unable to tell
consumers apart. (iv) The objective for the social planner is to design a nonlinear outlay
schedule.
1.5.3 Overview of the Thesis
In the second chapter, Nonlinear Pricing under a Balanced-Budget Requirement, we con-
sider a finite economy that is based on the premises in Section 1.5.2 with the additional
assumption that the net utility from consumption is so high that we do not have to
consider the individual rationality constraints (see also Laffont, 1997). In this economy,
we characterize the set that consists of all envy-free (i.e. incentive compatible), budget-
balanced and Pareto efficient nonlinear outlay schedules. In our characterization process,
we develop a procedure that is based on the concept of fairness, which was first explored
by Foley (1967). Hence, our approach is somewhat different from the ”standard” pro-
cedure of maximizing a weighted linear-in-utility social welfare function (as described in
Section 1.4.2) and has, to the best of my knowledge, not been presented in the literature
before. Apart from introducing a new procedure to investigate and analyze nonlinear
outlay schedules, we contribute to the existing literature in the sense that we provide a
complete characterization of the set of envy-free, budget-balanced and Pareto efficient
nonlinear pricing schedules in a finite economy that is based on the above premises. This
characterization has not been presented earlier in the literature. Our results generalize
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most of the findings in Sharkey and Sibley (1993) and the second-degree price discrimi-
nation results in Laffont (1997). We also reproduce some well known results contained in
the literature.
In the third chapter, Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game, we investigate, as
e.g. in Sorenson et al. (1976,1978) and Young (1998), nonlinear outlay schedules that
are based on a cooperative surplus game with transferable utility. We first characterize
the budget-balanced core of the cooperative pricing game and demonstrate that it is
non-empty. This result is well known. The budget-balanced core consists of all budget-
balanced nonlinear outlay schedules that satisfy the stand-alone principle, i.e. the realized
net surplus for any consumer (or coalition of consumers) should not be lower than the
consumer (or the coalition of consumers) can achieve on his (their) own. However, since
there is an asymmetry of information in the economy (see Section 1.4.2), the schedules in
the budget-balanced core need not be envy-free (i.e. incentive compatible). We, therefore,
investigate the nonlinear schedules in the budget-balanced core that satisfy the envy-
freeness criterion. A nonlinear schedule that belongs to this set is said to be in the
envy-free core. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be
non-empty and demonstrate that, if the envy-free core is non-empty, it typically consists
of a large number of nonlinear outlay schedules. Suppose, however, that the social planner
would like to implement one specific schedule. For this purpose, we consider three solution
concepts for the cooperative pricing game, each of them having the property that they
single out a unique price schedule. The solution concepts under consideration are the
Shapley value, the Lorentz criterion and the equal-share rule. These solution concepts
reflect the social planners distributional preferences. Under a restrictive assumption,
we demonstrate that the only one of the above three nonlinear schedules that is always
in the envy-free core is the schedule that is based on the Shapley value. The chapter
contributes to the existing literature in two senses. Firstly, we characterize the envy-free
core and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty.
Secondly, we implement nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus
pricing game with transferable utility in a standard nonlinear pricing environment with
asymmetric information. Our results generalize the work by Sorenson et al. (1978).
In the last chapter, Nonlinear Pricing and Equality of Opportunity, we implement the
equality of opportunity (EOp, henceforth) criterion in a nonlinear pricing environment
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that is based on the assumptions in Section 1.5.2, and investigate the welfare properties
of the optimal nonlinear EOp outlay schedule. In our analysis, the maximin and the
utilitarian nonlinear schedules serve as benchmarks. We demonstrate that the optimal
EOp policy is a reasonable compromise between the optimal maximin and the optimal
utilitarian policy in that the EOp policy is more (less) efficient, from a first-best perspec-
tive, than the maximin (utilitarian) policy and, at the same time, more (less) egalitarian
than the utilitarian (maximin) policy. The main contribution to the literature is that we
present a framework under which the EOp criterion (in the sense of Roemer, 1998) can
be applied in order to derive optimal EOp nonlinear pricing schedules. As far as I know,
the EOp criterion has never been considered in the nonlinear pricing literature before.
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